一种简单的方法是提供高分值的加密散列及其本身的分数。例如，当通过HTTP GET发布结果时: http://example.com/highscores.php?score=500&checksum=0a16df3dc0301a36a34f9065c3ff8095

当计算这个校验和时，应该使用一个共享秘密;这个秘密永远不应该通过网络传输，而应该在PHP后端和flash前端中硬编码。上面的校验和是通过将字符串“secret”前置到分数“500”前，并通过md5sum运行来创建的。

Although this system will prevent a user from posting arbitrary scores, it does not prevent a "replay attack", where a user reposts a previously calculated score and hash combination. In the example above, a score of 500 would always produce the same hash string. Some of this risk can be mitigated by incorporating more information (such as a username, timestamp, or IP address) in the string which is to be hashed. Although this will not prevent the replay of data, it will insure that a set of data is only valid for a single user at a single time.

为了防止任何重放攻击的发生，必须创建某种类型的挑战-响应系统，例如:

The flash game ("the client") performs an HTTP GET of http://example.com/highscores.php with no parameters. This page returns two values: a randomly generated salt value, and a cryptographic hash of that salt value combined with the shared secret. This salt value should be stored in a local database of pending queries, and should have a timestamp associated with it so that it can "expire" after perhaps one minute. The flash game combines the salt value with the shared secret and calculates a hash to verify that this matches the one provided by the server. This step is necessary to prevent tampering with salt values by users, as it verifies that the salt value was actually generated by the server. The flash game combines the salt value with the shared secret, high score value, and any other relevant information (nickname, ip, timestamp), and calculates a hash. It then sends this information back to the PHP backend via HTTP GET or POST, along with the salt value, high score, and other information. The server combines the information received in the same way as on the client, and calculates a hash to verify that this matches the one provided by the client. It then also verifies that the salt value is still valid as listed in the pending query list. If both these conditions are true, it writes the high score to the high score table and returns a signed "success" message to the client. It also removes the salt value from the pending query list.

请记住，如果用户可以访问共享秘密，则上述任何技术的安全性都会受到损害

作为一种替代方法，可以通过强制客户端通过HTTPS与服务器通信，并确保客户端预先配置为只信任由您单独有权访问的特定证书颁发机构签署的证书来避免这种来回。

一种简单的方法是提供高分值的加密散列及其本身的分数。例如，当通过HTTP GET发布结果时: http://example.com/highscores.php?score=500&checksum=0a16df3dc0301a36a34f9065c3ff8095

当计算这个校验和时，应该使用一个共享秘密;这个秘密永远不应该通过网络传输，而应该在PHP后端和flash前端中硬编码。上面的校验和是通过将字符串“secret”前置到分数“500”前，并通过md5sum运行来创建的。

Although this system will prevent a user from posting arbitrary scores, it does not prevent a "replay attack", where a user reposts a previously calculated score and hash combination. In the example above, a score of 500 would always produce the same hash string. Some of this risk can be mitigated by incorporating more information (such as a username, timestamp, or IP address) in the string which is to be hashed. Although this will not prevent the replay of data, it will insure that a set of data is only valid for a single user at a single time.

为了防止任何重放攻击的发生，必须创建某种类型的挑战-响应系统，例如:

The flash game ("the client") performs an HTTP GET of http://example.com/highscores.php with no parameters. This page returns two values: a randomly generated salt value, and a cryptographic hash of that salt value combined with the shared secret. This salt value should be stored in a local database of pending queries, and should have a timestamp associated with it so that it can "expire" after perhaps one minute. The flash game combines the salt value with the shared secret and calculates a hash to verify that this matches the one provided by the server. This step is necessary to prevent tampering with salt values by users, as it verifies that the salt value was actually generated by the server. The flash game combines the salt value with the shared secret, high score value, and any other relevant information (nickname, ip, timestamp), and calculates a hash. It then sends this information back to the PHP backend via HTTP GET or POST, along with the salt value, high score, and other information. The server combines the information received in the same way as on the client, and calculates a hash to verify that this matches the one provided by the client. It then also verifies that the salt value is still valid as listed in the pending query list. If both these conditions are true, it writes the high score to the high score table and returns a signed "success" message to the client. It also removes the salt value from the pending query list.

请记住，如果用户可以访问共享秘密，则上述任何技术的安全性都会受到损害

作为一种替代方法，可以通过强制客户端通过HTTPS与服务器通信，并确保客户端预先配置为只信任由您单独有权访问的特定证书颁发机构签署的证书来避免这种来回。

你可能问错了问题。你似乎专注于人们通过游戏获得高分的方法，但阻止特定的方法也仅此而已。我没有TamperData的经验，所以我不能说。

你应该问的问题是:“我如何验证提交的分数是有效和真实的?”具体方法取决于游戏。对于非常简单的益智游戏，你可能会发送分数以及特定的开始状态和导致结束状态的移动顺序，然后在服务器端使用相同的移动重新运行游戏。确认陈述的分数与计算的分数相同，只有在两者匹配时才接受分数。

根据我的经验，这最好是一个社会工程问题，而不是一个编程问题。与其专注于让作弊变得不可能，不如专注于通过消除作弊动机来让它变得无聊。例如，如果主要动机是公开可见的高分，那么简单地延迟高分的显示时间就可以通过消除作弊者的正反馈循环来显著减少作弊。

使用已知(私有)可逆密钥进行加密是最简单的方法。我不完全使用AS，所以我不确定有哪些类型的加密提供商。

但你也可以加入游戏长度(同样是加密的)和点击次数等变量。

所有这类事情都可以逆向工程，所以可以考虑扔进一堆垃圾数据来迷惑人们。

编辑:可能也值得加入一些PHP会话。当玩家点击“开始游戏”时便开始游戏，并记录时间。当他们提交分数时，你可以检查他们是否有一个开放的游戏，他们没有过早或过大地提交分数。

也许有必要计算出一个标量，比如每秒钟/分钟游戏的最大分数。

这两件事都不是不可避免的，但这将有助于在Flash之外的地方设置一些逻辑，让人们可以看到它。

我喜欢tpqf所说的，但是当作弊被发现时，与其禁用一个帐户，不如实施一个蜜罐，这样每当他们登录时，他们都会看到他们被黑客攻击的分数，并且永远不会怀疑他们已经被标记为喷子。谷歌为“phpBB MOD Troll”，你会看到一个巧妙的方法。